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127 
NG9-1-1, CYBERSECURITY, AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MODEL 
FRAMEWORK FOR A SECURE NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Andrew Jackson Coley 
The critical communications infrastructure in the United States is now 
outdated and inefficient, and therefore vulnerable to network crashes and cyber-
attacks. The failure to allocate resources efficiently arises from 9-1-1, the 
public’s primary connection to emergency services in the United States.1 This 
lapse in policy has recently garnered attention, bringing forth a new generation 
of communications networks, which may be the saving grace of our emergency 
communications infrastructure.2 This advancement is Next Generation 9-1-1 
(NG9-1-1). NG9-1-1 is a substantial upgrade to today’s standard 9-1-1 system’s 
“hardware, software, data and operational policies and procedures,” and will 
improve data and call routing capabilities, integrate call data for use by 
emergency responders, provide secure call networks, and deliver calls to the 
appropriate Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), among other enhanced 
capabilities.3 
However, 9-1-1 networks across the United States will be advanced only 
                                                          
 Andrew Jackson Coley is a third-year law student at the Catholic University of America, 
Columbus School of Law, and completed his undergraduate degree in Political Science at 
Quinnipiac University. Andrew’s primary academic interest is the laws response to rapid 
advancements in technology, particularly in regard to military affairs and national security. 
The author offers his thanks to Brian Fontes, his mentor on the topic, who was instrumental 
in this piece. 
 
 1 9-1-1 Origin & History, NENA, https://www.nena.org/page/911overviewfacts (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 2 See Health of the US 9-1-1 System, 9-1-1 INDUSTRY ALLIANCE, 
https://www.theindustrycouncil.org/9IA_Health_of_US_911%20_2_.pdf. (last visited Nov. 
1, 2018). 
 3 What is NG9-1-1?, NENA,  https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/ 
ng9-1-1_project/whatisng911.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
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through policy and legislation that focuses on recognizing security as an integral 
part of a network.4 If successfully implemented, NG9-1-1 may serve as a 
template for implementing secure, reliable, and resilient communications 
networks within both the public and private industry.5 As the next iteration of 
advanced public safety communications networks, NG9-1-1 is an ideal 
representation of advanced IP-enabled infrastructure with security measures 
naturally integrated into the system. 
In November 2017, Congress proposed legislation to advance the rollout of 
NG9-1-1 systems.6 The proposed legislation is bringing much needed attention 
to the underfunded emergency call network. It is also representative of a 
significant issue facing 9-1-1 call networks throughout the country, which is the 
inability to update Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP), the local location 
where your 9-1-1 call is answered, without federal funding and resources.7 
Across the United States, PSAPs are operating at regional and local levels, 
and the results are significantly varied.8 Although there have been improvements 
in PSAP’s throughout the country with many states and localities pushing hard 
to update their systems to next generation technology, as former FCC Chairman 
Wheeler stated in his testimony before Congress, “these islands of progress are 
the exception, not the rule.”9 Many PSAPs face significant funding and 
operational challenges, resulting in out-of-date capabilities equivalent to the 
functionality of over thirty years ago.10 9-1-1 networks, by nature, are state run 
or local programs.11 The NG9-1-1 proposed legislation presents an opportunity 
                                                          
 4 Next Generation 9-1-1 Act of 2017, S. 2061, 115th Cong. (2017); Jane Edwards, 
GAO: NHTSA Needs to Establish National 911 Program Performance Goals to Back 
NG911 Implementation, EXEC. GOV. (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.executivegov.com/2018/02/gao-nhtsa-needs-to-establish-national-911-
program-performance-goals-to-back-ng911-implementation/; Christine Kenneally, How to 
Fix 911, TIME (Apr. 17, 2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2062452,00.html. 
 5 See Next Generation 9-1-1 Transition Policy Implementation Handbook, NENA (June 
2011), https://www.911.gov/pdf/NENA_NG911_Transition_Policy_Handbook_2010.pdf. 
 6 Id.; Staff Discussion Draft- Next Generation 91-1- Act of 2017, NENA, 
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/govaffairs/Overview_—
_Draft_Next_Gener.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 7 See David Raths, The NG911 Funding Gap, GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 2, 2016), 
http://www.govtech.com/em/next-gen-911/The-NG911-Funding-Gap.html. 
 8 Health of the US 9-1-1 System, supra note 2. 
 9 Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On Commc’n and Tech., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Tom Wheeler, 
Chairman, Fed. Commc’n Comm.) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
 10 Raths, supra note 7. 
 11 Andrew Hartsig, Calling 911: Funding and Technological Challenges of County 911 
Centers, NACO, https://www.naco.org/resources/calling-911-funding-and-technological-
challenges-county-911-call-centers. (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
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for Congress to create legislation providing federal support to PSAPs while still 
maintaining the localized nature of 9-1-1 operating systems.12 While the 
operation of the current 9-1-1 model is effective at a local level, a lack of federal 
support enables the continued use of outdated technology in many PSAPs across 
the country.13 Further, without federal support, PSAPs will implement next 
generation technology in vastly different proportions dependent upon locally 
available funding.14 The scale of cyber vulnerabilities that IP-enabled call 
networks present, and the discrepancies and disproportionate capabilities 
between PSAPs create an imminent security threat to 9-1-1 call networks.15 
Moreover, the NG9-1-1 initiative shows migration to more efficient and 
sophisticated IP-enabled tech systems. As 9-1-1 networks transition to more 
security-centric systems, it will be beneficial to enact legislation and create 
policies that ensure nationwide infrastructure is duly updated and improved. 
This Comment will evaluate prevalent security concerns that the transition 
from current 9-1-1 network technologies to the next generation of IP enabled 9-
1-1 call networks will highlight. This Comment will also analyze both local and 
federal risk mitigation options, as well as applicability to the broader critical 
infrastructure security within the United States. First, this Comment will look to 
the history of 9-1-1 call networks, why they require an upgrade, and the 
advantages of NG9-1-1 and advanced IP-based emergency call networks. 
Second, while there are advantages to IP-based call networks, there are also risks 
and vulnerabilities. This Comment will explore these risks by examining 
commercial and private sector cyber breaches that exposed the vulnerabilities of 
big data and IP-based networks, and the similar vulnerabilities present in NG9-
1-1. Third, with an understanding of the risks and benefits of IP networks, we 
apply those risks to 9-1-1 networks, and explore the advantages and mitigation 
options brought by these networks. Due to the local nature of PSAPs and 9-1-1 
call networks and the national scale of the problem, we look to other federal 
programs operating on similar scales, as well as fundamental cybersecurity 
hygiene practices that may aid in reducing risk to NG9-1-1 networks. Lastly, 
this Comment will examine how increased federal involvement in 9-1-1, but not 
necessarily a federalization of the system, can create a more secure emergency 
call network. A look at proposed federal legislation and ongoing grant programs 
                                                          
 12 Chris Nussman, NENA Applauds Introduction of NG9-1-1 Legislation, NENA (Nov. 3, 
2017), https://www.nena.org/news/372953/NENA-Applauds-Introduction-of-NG9-1-1-
Legislation.htm. 
 13 See Raths, supra note 7; see also Collin Wood, Next-gen 911 Matching Grant Rules 
Open for Comment, ST. SCOOP (Sept. 22, 2017), https://statescoop.com/rules-to-issue-next-
gen-911-matching-grants-open-for-comment. 
 14 See 911.GOV, 911 Grant Program, NAT’L 911 PROGRAM ADMINISTERED GRANTS, 
https://www.911.gov/project_911grantprogram.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
 15 Raths, supra note 7. 
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reveals an acknowledgement by legislators and the executive branch alike of the 
need for increased support for NG9-1-1. 
As society increasingly relies upon IP-based networks for incredible 
advancements in technology, new threats and vulnerabilities emerge that must 
be recognized and swiftly resolved.16 NG9-1-1 presents an opportunity to plan 
for some of the greatest threats to society in the 21st century with a security first 
perspective.17 Although experts within the public safety communications 
industry have provided research and recommendations to increase the security 
of PSAPs and NG9-1-1 networks, it is vital that enhanced cyber security of 
PSAPs are implemented in a manner that is practicable.18 The nature of PSAPs, 
and their varying capabilities and resources, makes the challenge of securing 
seamlessly integrated PSAPs in the future all the more difficult. However, the 
9-1-1 PSAP rollout reflects global advancements to IP-based systems with 
seamless integration, and the best way to approach this migration of technology 
is with a focus on security. 
I.   THE CURRENT STATE OF 9-1-1 
The one phone number that nearly every American can recognize is 9-1-1.19 
According to the National Emergency Number Association, approximately 
“96% of the U.S. is covered by some type of 9-1-1 service.”20 The number of 9-
1-1 calls per year is approximately 240 million, and over 80 percent of those 
calls are placed wirelessly.21 The advanced capabilities of “smartphones” 
permits virtual interactions that are significantly more advanced than the basic 
9-1-1 networks are capable of supporting.22  The Minnesota Department of 
Public Safety states that: “a new generation of access devices presents a 
technology challenge to systems originally designed to provide only fixed 
                                                          
 16 Cyber Risks to Next Generation 9-1-1, NAT’L 911 PROGRAM ADMINISTERED GRANTS, 
https://www.911.gov/pdf/OEC_NG911_Cybersecurity_Primer_May_2018.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2018). 
 17 See Future of 9-1-1 Issue Brief, CENTURYLINK, http://www.centurylink.com/asset/ 
business/enterprise/issue-brief/gbc-centurylink-n911-issue-brief-cm160716.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2018). 
 18 Mike Beagles, BUILD A SMART PSAP CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: 8 
CRITICAL “MUST-HAVES,” MISSIONCRITICALPARTNERS (Sept. 5, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
http://blog.mcp911.com/insights/psapcybersecuritymusthaves. 
 19 See 9-1-1 Origin and History, supra note 1. 
 20 Id. 
 21 9-1-1 Statistics, NENA (Dec. 2017), https://www.nena.org/page/911Statistics. 
 22 See 9-1-1 Origin and History, supra note 1; Next Generation 9-1-1 Transition Policy 
Implementation Handbook, supra note 5. 
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landline 911 calls.”23 Basic 9-1-1 systems experience difficulty in supporting 
“text messages for emergencies, images and video (including support for 
American Sign Language users), and easy access to additional data such as 
telematics data, building plans and medical information over a common data 
network.”24 The National Emergency Number Association (NENA), has pointed 
out that increased “inter-communications across states, between states, and 
across international boundaries requires that we create a more flexible 9-1-1 
system design with much greater data handling capabilities.”25 As such, 9-1-1 
systems throughout the country are due for an upgrade to prevailing technical 
standards.26 Responders should reap the benefits of the litany of advancements 
in wireless technology, such as the useful integration of data and standardized 
interface surfaces for calls and messaging, because it will be standard in NG9-
1-1 systems.27 
II.  WHAT IS NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1? 
The transition from basic 9-1-1 networks to NG9-1-1 networks is, at its core, 
a transition from analog to digital networks.28 The New and Emerging 
Technologies 9-1-1 Act of 2008 summarized NG911 as “a national IP-enabled 
emergency network capable of receiving and responding to all citizen-activated 
emergency communications and improving information sharing among all 
emergency response entities.”29 Accordingly, the Next Generation systems will 
be able to receive all the data, text, and video capabilities that expand with 
modern smartphone technology.30 These upgraded networks, called Emergency 
Services Internet Protocol Networks (ESINets), provide PSAP’s the ability to 
                                                          
 23 NEXTGEN 911, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ecn/programs/911/Pages/nextgen-911.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 
2018). 
 24 What is NG9-1-1?, supra note 3. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Senators Nelson & Klobuchar, STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT—NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 
ACT OF 2017, http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/govaffairs/ 
Overview_—_Draft_Next_Gener.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 27 9-1-1 Origin and History, supra note 1; NAT’L 9-1-1 PROGRAM 2017 NATIONAL 911 
PROGRESS REPORT (Nov. 2017), https://www.911.gov/pdf/National-911-Program-Profile-
Database-Progress-Report-2017.pdf; see also What is NG9-1-1?, supra note 3. 
 28 Next Generation 911, supra note 5. 
 29 New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
283, 122 Stat. 2620 (2008). 
 30 See Fed. Comm. Commc’n, 47 Fed. Reg. 78, 1799 (Jan. 9, 2013) (to be codified at 
C.F.R. pt. 20) (discussing how Next Generation 9-1-1 technology will support text 
messaging and other forms of data transmission); 1 NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1: THE ESSENTIAL 
GUIDE TO GETTING STARTED, WEST CORP. (2013), http://www.intrado.com/sites/default/files/ 
documents/NextGen%209-11%20The%20Essential%20Guide%20to%20Getting%20 
Started.pdf; Next Generation 9-1-1, supra note 5; What is NG9-1-1?, supra note 3. 
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transmit larger and more significant amounts of information to police, EMS, 
firefighters, and other emergency service personnel that PSAPs dispatch.31 
ESINet’s are “designed with a high level of redundancy and resiliency to ensure 
that the network can continue to operate and deliver 911 calls even if some of 
the circuits or end points are no longer functioning.”32 Notoriously, natural 
disasters disable the outdated PSAP’s basic 9-1-1 system, however, the 9-1-1 
systems of the future will function during these dire times.33 In addition, the 
consumers, people calling 9-1-1 in an emergency, will have the capability of 
transmitting more useful information, such as real-time text messages, videos, 
images, pertinent medical information and more to emergency responders.34 As 
a result, data which was previously unusable by most 9-1-1 systems will provide 
advanced capabilities to first responders in jurisdictions with NG9-1-1 
systems.35 For example, NG9-1-1 networks allow for accurate location 
information through data transmitted based on the location of the 9-1-1 caller.36 
One of the significant aspects of NG9-1-1 will be the “seamless 
interoperability” of the emergency network.37 “Seamless interoperability,” as 
explained by the Association of Public Safety Communications (APCO), means 
PSAPs are able to “dynamically share resources and reroute calls, which is 
particularly valuable during high call volume periods and major disasters 
affecting PSAP operations.” This ability to share resources and reroute calls 
“should be possible regardless of what call handling equipment, computer aided 
dispatch, or connecting networks . . . the PSAPs have deployed.”38 The president 
of APCO states that “seamless interoperability will improve emergency 
response operations and expand the market so that public safety benefits from 
the competition and innovation enjoyed in the commercial sector.”39 
                                                          
 31 Jeff Lupinacci, ESInets are a Game Changer for Public Safety and the First Step to 
Next-Gen 911, GOV’T TECH. (May 6, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/em/next-gen-
911/ESInets-Are-a-Game-Changer-for-Public-Safety.html; Next Generation 9-1-1, supra 
note 5. 
 32 Lupinacci, supra note 31. 
 33 See Nussman, supra note 12 (discussing a legislative call for next generation 9-1-1 
technology during a natural disaster). 
 34 DEP’T OF PUB. TRANSP., NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 (2018), 
https://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/pdf/JPO_NextGen911_v2.pdf. 
 35 NG9-1-1 Project, NENA, https://www.nena.org/page/NG911_Project (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2018). 
 36 FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, INQUIRY CONCERNING 911 ACCESS, ROUTING, AND 
LOCATION IN ENTERPRISE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, PS Docket No. 17-239 (Sept. 7, 
2017), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-346580A1.pdf. 
 37 Martha Carter, Achieving Fully Interoperable NG9-1-1, ASS’N OF PUB. SAFETY 
COMMC’N (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.apcointl.org/achieving-fully-interoperable-ng911/. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Achieving the True Promise of NG9-1-1, ASS’N OF PUB. SAFETY COMMC’N (June 12, 
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Such interoperability will be particularly useful in a 9-1-1 outage, when the 
public is unable to reach 9-1-1 call centers.40 In 2017, AT&T experienced a 
nationwide 9-1-1 call failure, where 9-1-1 callers reported either a busy signal 
or continuous ringing.41 This particular failure affected the United States on a 
massive scale, affecting 18 states and the District of Columbia.42 The system 
failure was a result of AT&T’s failure to follow “certain best practices outlined 
by the FCC’s [(Federal Communications Commission)] Communications 
Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council”.43 However, a fully integrated 
NG9-1-1 network should be able to avoid an operational failure at such a large 
scale due to the resiliency and interconnectedness of NG9-1-1 networks.44 
Ideally, during a system failure, NG9-1-1 networks may transfer calls from one 
PSAP to another without the technical difficulty of outdated 9-1-1 systems, 
which relied upon specialized switches as opposed to IP-based networks.45 Basic 
9-1-1 networks simply do not possess the dynamic technology required to ensure 
that reliable public safety communications remain available to the public during 
a third-party network outage.46 The systems of NG9-1-1, based on IP networks, 
will possess the ability to transfer calls quickly and efficiently and have calls 
redirected to operational PSAPs in the event other PSAPs experience failures 
                                                          
2017), https://www.apcointl.org/tabletopx/achieving-the-true-promise-of-next-generation-9-
1-1. 
 40 Adrienne Lafrance, The 9-1-1 Paradox, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/the-9-1-1-paradox/519192/; 
Amanda Jackson, FCC investigating AT&T 911 outage, CNN (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/us/att-911-outages-trnd/index.html; see also The Network, 
FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/network (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) (explaining that 
FirstNet is a nationally designed network created to serve as a public safety communications 
network with standards matching the commercial minimum standard, where seamless 
interoperability refers to a PSAP’s ability to transfer calls and aid other PSAP’s exchange of 
data between connecting networks (ESInets) across jurisdictions, and the seamless exchange 
of data between ESInets and public information systems, as well as between NG9-1-1 and 
FirstNet). 
 41 Lafrance, supra note 40; Jackson, supra note 40. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Colin Gibbs, AT&T’s 911 Outage ‘Result of Mistakes Made by AT&T,’ FCC’s Pai 
says, FIERCE WIRELESS (May 18, 2017), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/at-t-s-911-
outage-result-mistakes-made-by-at-t-fcc-s-pai-says; FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau Reminds Communications Service Providers of Importance of 
Implementing Network Reliability Best Practices, 17 FED. REG. 672 (Proposed July 12, 
2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR §§ 0.191, 0.392), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-17-672A1.pdf. 
 44 Achieving the True Promise of Next Generation 9-1-1, supra note 39; White Paper: 




 45 White Paper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44. 
 46 Id. 
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within their systems. 47 
NG9-1-1 will provide a significant number of benefits to public safety.48 With 
advanced systems, emergency responders will be capable of responding to 
emergencies with significantly more information than previously available.49 
With assistance from the federal government in universal implementation of 
NG9-1-1, the benefits of IP-based communications networks will be more far 
reaching than any previously operated public safety system.50 NG9-1-1 will 
provide vast improvements to the public safety arena, which is in vital need of 
updates.51 However, the benefits of NG9-1-1 are dependent upon the successful 
collection and processing of a significant amount of data.52 As such, NG9-1-1 
will be subject to the same risks as other “big data” collectors, including major 
data breaches affecting the public at large.53 Moreover, given the high stakes of 
emergency preparedness and response, the consequences of a failure to 
recognize the risks of an IP-based emergency network will likely have greater 
consequences than the private sector.54 The first step in preparation is to review 
the history of major data breaches with a security centric perspective in order to 
avoid mistakes of the past.55 
A.  Big Data and Privacy Concerns 
“Big data” refers to the collection and use of massive amounts of data sets to 
form relationships.56 In the context of 9-1-1, collection of 9-1-1 caller data 
produces a rich amount of information, providing first responders with critical 
                                                          
 47 Id. 
 48 White Paper: A Next Generation 911 Cost Study A Basis for Public Funding 
Essential to Bringing a Nationwide Next Generation 911 Network to America’s 
Communication User and First Responders, FCC (Sept. 2011), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-309744A1.pdf. 
 49 White Paper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44. 
 50 115th Cong., 1st Session (Nov. 2017); JILL C. GALLAGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R45253, NEXT GENERATION 911 TECHNOLOGIES: SELECT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2018). 
 51 Hearing on S. Hrg. 112-576 Before the Subcomm. on the Comm., Tech., and the 
Internet of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 113th Cong., 32-33, (June 5, 
2014). 
 52 Whitepaper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44. 
 53 F.C.C. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR STATEWIDE 9-1-1 SERVICE FOR FY 2015-2019 (July 
2014), https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/Net%20911/7th-Report/Texas_StrategicPlan_15-
19.pdf. 
 54 JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMM. CAPABILITIES OF EMERGENCY MED. AND PUB. 
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES: REPORT TO CONG. 11-12 (Feb. 4, 2008), 
https://www.ems.gov/pdf/FCC-JAC-Report.pdf. 
 55 See generally White Paper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44. 
 56 Big Data and the Future of Privacy, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/big-data/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
2018]NG9-1-1, Cybersecurity & Contributions to the Model Framework 135 
information in emergency responses.57 Big data has endless applications. For 
example, big data collection methods form the basis for the most successful 
companies of the 21st century.58 Google and Facebook collect massive quantities 
of data about their users, and later sell that data for profit.59 Such uses of big data 
are beneficial to society and largely contribute to economic growth.60 However, 
there are significant privacy and security concerns related to the collection of 
big data, in particular when network security flaws lead to the hacking and 
stealing of inconceivable amounts of data.61 
The most recent notable massive data breach and exposure of significant 
quantities of data was the Equifax security breach of 2017.62 The private 
information of 143 million Americans was accessed and exposed through this 
credit reporting agency breach.63 The hackers were able to access credit card 
numbers and documents containing personal information for over 200,000 
people throughout the United States, UK, and Canada.64 
Such a breach leaves anyone involved vulnerable, exposing the most private 
                                                          
 57 See generally id.; Rebecca Jeschke, A Privacy Emergency: Consumer Rights at Risk 
in Next Generation 911, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 14, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/03/privacy-emergency-consumer-rights-risk-next; 
Notice of Request, 79 Fed. Reg 12251 (Mar. 4, 2014). 
 58 See, e.g., Avantika Monnappa, How Facebook is Using Big Data - The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, SIMPLILEARN (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.simplilearn.com/how-
facebook-is-using-big-data-article. 
 59 Id.; Ian Bogost, Welcome to the Age of Privacy Nihilism, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/08/the-age-of-privacy-nihilism-is-
here/568198/. 
 60 FACT SHEET: PCAST Report on Big Data and Privacy: A Technological 
Perspective, WHITE HOUSE (May 14, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-pcast-report-big-data-and-privacy-technological-
perspective; Josh Green, Big Data: The Key to Economic Development?, WIRED, 
https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/03/big-data-the-key-to-economic-development/ (last 
visited on Nov. 26, 2018). 
 61 Jason Parms, More Info, More Problems: Privacy and Security Issues in the Age of 
Big Data, BUS. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.business.com/articles/privacy-and-security-
issues-in-the-age-of-big-data/; see also Stacy Collett, Five New Threats to Your Mobile 
Security, CSO (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2157785/data-
protection/five-new-threats-to-your-mobile-security.html (providing examples of network 
security flaws that lead to stolen data). 
 62 See generally Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE 
COMM. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-
what-do. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. (explaining that the Equifax security breach allowed hackers to access information 
including credit card numbers, and personal identifying information including names, Social 
Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and driver’s license numbers for thousands of card 
holders); see generally OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., CYBER RISKS TO NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 2 (2016). 
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and significant identifying information.65 Although Equifax’s awareness of a 
bug in their system may be cited as irresponsible for careless cybersecurity 
standards, data breaches of this scale are far from abnormal.66 For example, in 
2013, Yahoo was hacked and an estimated 3 billion accounts were 
compromised, reportedly most likely by a state sponsored actor.67 Other 
significant data breaches include: eBay, JP Morgan Chase, the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, and Sony’s PlayStation Network, among many others.68 
The significance of these breaches is in the characteristics that define them. Each 
breach is the result of network vulnerabilities being exploited for one reason or 
another.69 While the effects of a data breach on a commercial entity can 
significantly damage an entity’s reputation, the effect of a large scale system 
failure, or exploitation of the advanced systems of NG9-1-1 would place lives 
directly in danger.70 An act of cyber breach on an NG9-1-1 system can critically 
delay emergency services.71 With the imminent popularity of fully integrated 
systems, next generation emergency services will become enhanced by the 
massive quantities of data available through integration with elements of “smart 
cities,” simultaneously creating a more effective emergency network, as well as 
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Hacking, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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security-breach-all-users-must-their-change-passwords/#5b6d924f7492 (“origin of breach 
came from hackers compromising a small number of employee log-in credentials”). 
 70 How Data Breaches Can Affect Brand and Reputation, VITRIUM (July 23, 2015), 
http://blog.vitrium.com/document-security-protection-drm-blog/how-data-breaches-can-
affect-brand-and-reputation; OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64. 
 71 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 1. 
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a goldmine of data available to any hacker capable of exploiting network design 
flaws if they are not addressed.72 However, NG9-1-1 is one looming 
vulnerability in an age soon to be encompassed by integrated big data collection 
networks.73 
B.  Smart Cities and NG9-1-1 
NG9-1-1 is a significant step in the ongoing process of integrating technology 
into the infrastructure of cities during a time of increasingly significant 
urbanization.74 With over 50 percent of the global population living in cities, the 
efficiency in which people and their environment interact needs improvement.75 
Smart cities are envisioned to be “environmentally sustainable, provide efficient 
transportation, have efficient use of resources, improved urban planning, and 
enhanced public safety.”76 Such vastly improved efficiency will be, in part, the 
product of big data analytics, and there is no doubt that the improved efficiency 
that smart cities promise to bring are necessary.77 Among those benefits, there 
will be an integration of NG9-1-1 within smart cities planning and 
development.78 
While definitions vary, generally a smart city is “a municipality that uses 
information and communication technologies to increase operational efficiency, 
share information with the public and improve both the quality of government 
services and citizen welfare.”79 Although the improved operational efficiency of 
cities is necessary, and even critical to the further development of society, 80 
there are a number of significant risks that must be addressed, and continually 
updated as societal and technological transformations occur.81 Given the 
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significant number of components required to feed massive quantities of data for 
operational efficiency, it is clear that the transition to smart cities will not occur 
overnight. In fact, the transition is well underway, as evident by NG9-1-1 system 
initiatives.82 For that reason, the implications of an unsecure NG9-1-1 network 
could have detrimental consequences. 
If an NG9-1-1 network were crippled by a cyber-attack, the effects may be 
significantly amplified within the context of a smart city, and similarly, if a 
network within a smart city were compromised, NG9-1-1 networks may be 
placed in a more vulnerable position.83 This crippling effect is because all of 
these advanced data systems rely extensively on IP-based network integration, 
the complexity of which results in the potential for cyber vulnerabilities.84 For 
example, in 2017, just days before the inauguration of President Trump, 
Romanian hackers installed malware on D.C. police computers, requiring the 
police to disable about 70 percent of D.C. security cameras for several days 
while the malware was removed.85 Other attacks around the world include the 
2015 cyber-attacks on Ukrainian energy companies by suspected Russian 
hackers, and a cyber-attack on a terminal of India’s “largest container port,” 
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 83 Anuradha Shukla, Are Smart Cities Prepared For Cyber Attacks?, BUSINESSWORLD 
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networks used for NG9-1-1 security). 
 85 Ainsley, supra note 83; Kim Crawley, Washington DC Surveillance Cameras 
Infected by Ransomware, THREAT VECTOR (Jan. 17, 2018), 
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debilitating one of its essential terminals.86 Attacks on public safety, critical 
infrastructure, and commercial sectors, evidence the risk of significant exposure 
caused by malicious actors intending to do harm. 
What makes such vulnerability far more dangerous is the breadth of the attack. 
If hackers are capable of deleting footage stored on nearly an entire city’s 
security camera footage—what would stop the same hackers from turning all the 
traffic lights in a city green?87 On the other hand, what if a worker at a local 
energy company accidently downloads malware into the fully integrated electric 
grid, possibly disabling the ability to call a local PSAP? A hacker may as easily 
reroute calls from one PSAP’s jurisdiction to another with the intent of causing 
mass confusion in the wake of something more sinister, such as a terrorist 
attack.88 Therefore, because NG9-1-1 and other IP-based communication 
technologies will be fully integrated within a futuristic smart city environment, 
they must be designed by taking security into account throughout development 
in order to reduce vulnerabilities. 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF IP-BASED NETWORKS 
Your awareness of a medical emergency triggers your call to 9-1-1. You pick 
up your smartphone and begin instinctively dialing, but unexpectedly, the line is 
dead. Upon a second attempt from your cell phone with the same result, you may 
try using a landline to no avail. Panicked, you attempt to drive your critically 
injured neighbor to the hospital, which also happens to be in disarray. Without 
access to 9-1-1 dispatchers, a society that has become reliant on virtual 
communication is rendered lost.89 Such a scenario may be the result of a large 
scale cyber-attack on an NG9-1-1 network with lapses in cybersecurity 
preparedness.90 Per Murphy’s law, if something can go wrong, it will.91 In the 
digital age, there is an ever-present risk that malicious actors may exploit 
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network vulnerabilities.92 Fortunately, NG9-1-1 presents the opportunity to 
learn from past cyber threats and create a secure IP-based communications 
network.93 
The first step in analyzing risk is to identify possible threats one may 
encounter.94 NENA succinctly states: 
IP networks were developed to foster resilient connectivity but not 
security. IP multimedia services are easy targets because they are based 
on IP networks that are inherently insecure. IP was also developed to be 
flexible, so there are many types of services within today’s 
infrastructure that have been built on top of IP over time. Once you 
transition to NG9-1-1 you rely on these IP networks to deliver 
Emergency Services.95 
While NG9-1-1 possesses many capabilities that subvert the risk of operating 
on vulnerable IP-based networks (such as the ability to transfer calls from a 
PSAP that is experiencing a loss of operational capability to a functional PSAP 
in another jurisdiction), the constant and evolving nature of cyber threats and 
criminal capability ensures an ever-present risk.96 In an integrated network, an 
individual system may seem secure.97 However, vulnerabilities may be present, 
providing a litany of ways for criminals or state actors to gain access and exploit 
internet devices and applications.98 Crypting services used to encrypt malware 
can be used to hide viruses within systems for significant amounts of time with 
no clear alert.99 Hacking technology can be purchased at an affordable cost and 
is therefore easily accessible.100 A hacker may gain access to a seemingly secure 
network by exploiting the network connection using tactics such as “gathering 
intelligence—often through social engineering, implanting backdoors, 
strengthening control and access of the target’s network, exfiltrating data for as 
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long as they can, [and then] covering their tracks.”101 
Moreover, there is a distinct cyber vulnerability in PSAPs, particularly in the 
quantity of PSAPs, possessing insufficient resources required to effectively 
mitigate cyber vulnerabilities.102 According to Chris Patti, a technical writer for 
ComTech Telecommunications, “Cybersecurity is—by its very nature—an 
ongoing, ever-evolving, long-term process. There is no ‘magic bullet’ that will 
instantly whip an organization’s networks (and its users) into shape.”103 Because 
PSAPs are critical to the function of NG9-1-1 systems, it is of equal importance 
that they are secure.104 According to public safety expert Mike Beagles, PSAPs 
present a unique cyber vulnerability; “There are more than 6,000 PSAPs located 
across the country, and 80 percent of them are small, making them unlikely to 
have adequate cyber security defense programs.”105 Given the nature of NG9-1-
1, and the interoperability of ESI-networks and PSAPs, the security that an 
individual PSAP has will only protect the network to a certain extent.106 Security 
policies must be implemented to significantly decrease the risk of losing PSAP 
operational capabilities. Any PSAP policy that is implemented must focus on 
developing expertise in the foundational practices and basics of network 
security.107 Additionally, because PSAPs throughout the country have 
significant variances in resources, any implementation must also be realistic.108 
At the heart of any information security policy should be the CIA triad: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.109 
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A.  Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, also known as the CIA Triad 
(CIA), are the guiding principles for information and network security policies, 
which can form the basis of PSAP security.110 Confidentiality refers to the 
accessibility of information in a system.111 First, applying password protections, 
utilizing encryption services, and ensuring that data is accessed only by those 
who have clearance is central to confidentiality.112 Secondly, “Integrity means 
that attackers cannot change or destroy information in a computer or network 
without detection and that changed or destroyed information can be restored.”113 
Lastly, the availability of data focuses on having the ability to access data 
instantly.114 Consistent maintenance of software and hardware will ensure that 
data will be available.115 By using the triad as an evaluative tool, PSAPs can 
focus on the very basics of security with greater efficiency.116 The Department 
of Homeland Security elaborates on PSAP cyber security utilizing the CIA triad, 
stating: 
Loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability has especially severe 
impacts in the emergency response domain. For example, loss of 
confidentiality within NG911 systems could expose information to 
identity thefts or disrupt ongoing investigations; loss of integrity could 
disrupt response to 911 calls; and loss of availability could prevent 
urgent requests from reaching a PSAP.117  
 
The cyber security threats to NG9-1-1 networks stems from vulnerabilities 
present in devices and equipment, network infrastructure and connections, and 
data, applications, and services.118 A cybersecurity response must “mitigate[e] 
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risk by lessening vulnerabilities, deter threats, and minimize[e] 
consequences.”119 PSAPs of the future realistically cannot be entirely secure. 
Cyber breaches and illegal access to PSAPs will inevitably happen due to a 
variety of circumstances, including faults in security, mistakes, poor cyber 
hygiene, and malicious actors.120 By following basic cybersecurity protocols, 
PSAPs will be able to mitigate risks, and decrease the fallout from major 
incidents.121 PSAPs should follow basic cybersecurity protocols promulgated by 
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.122 
B.  NIST Framework 
NIST points out in its Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity, “[t]he Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing 
cybersecurity risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will continue to have 
unique risks—different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk 
tolerances—and how they implement the practices in the Framework will 
vary.”123 The goal of this framework is to provide a technologically neutral 
approach to implement best practices for cyber security.124 
The “Framework Core” is a set of five underlying principles meant to be 
considered in the implementation of dynamic best practices.125 The five 
underlying principles are: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.126  
Identify is a function focused on developing “an organizational understanding 
to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and 
capabilities.”127 “The Protect Function supports the ability to limit or contain the 
impact of a potential cybersecurity event,” with specific focus on cybersecurity 
awareness and training, data security, information protection processes and 
procedures, and other protective technologies.128 “The Detect Function enables 
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timely discovery of cybersecurity events.”129 Responding to cybersecurity 
events requires the implementation of appropriate activities regarding detection 
thereof.130 Recovery consists of developing and maintain a systems resiliency 
and capability to restore “any capabilities or services that were impaired due to 
a cybersecurity event.”131 
By implementing the NIST cyber-security framework, PSAP’s can ensure a 
high level of security through diligence in updating standards, and recognition 
of new threats.132 NG9-1-1 requires consistent security, that also detects ever-
evolving cyber threats.133 While the security of NG9-1-1 has certainly received 
recognition, and standards are in place to identify and solve technical issues, 
PSAPs and ESInets, along with all Voice Over Internet Protocol 
Communications, still remain vulnerable.134 The policies and administrative 
agencies that are charged with ensuring the security for NG9-1-1 must ensure 
security protocols in the evolution of NG9-1-1. 
IV.  NG9-1-1 LEGISLATION 
In November 2017, Congress introduced the Next Generation 9-1-1 Act of 
2017 (the Act) to support and aid the deployment of nationwide NG9-1-1 
systems.135 The policy goals of the Act include creating “seamless 
interoperability between PSAPs;”136 maintaining State, regional, and local levels 
of control; the promotion of “increased compatibility”; and the “functional 
interconnection of the nation’s 9-1-1 systems with the wireless nationwide 
public safety broadband network being deployed by the First Responder 
Network Authority.”137 Many PSAPs have already commenced transition to the 
IP-based NG9-1-1 systems.138 While the Act calls for increased action on critical 
issues facing the implementation of NG9-1-1, such as cybersecurity, there are 
practical barriers facing NG9-1-1, namely funding considerations for PSAPs.139 
Increased federal support to PSAPs is necessary if the substance of the Act is to 
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be realized. 
A.  The Next Generation 9-1-1 Act Implementation 
The Act is a necessary piece of proposed legislation to provide guidance and 
funding, to ensure an effective rollout of NG9-1-1 nationwide.140 The Act first 
acknowledges that nationwide framework is “essential to help guide the 
transition” to NG9-1-1, while still maintaining the need to preserve “[s]tate, 
regional, and local control over the governance and technology choices of the 
Nation’s 9-1-1 systems.”141 Maintaining localized control is a primary policy 
point of the Act.142 This is because 9-1-1 is a state-provided emergency call 
network and each state has their own model by which they operate emergency 
response systems.143 It is a localized system, and many PSAPs have not been 
significantly updated since the 1970s.144 The Act addresses the significant 
vulnerabilities inherent in IP-based networks.145 However, without a more 
effective implementation of federal efforts and funding, NG9-1-1 will fall victim 
to the very same discrepancies of the current 9-1-1 system and lag behind in 
many areas of the country.146 The National 9-1-1 program analyzed a survey of 
states transitioning to NG9-1-1, stating: 
about half of states were transitioning to NG911 in 2015, but that state 
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systems to cyber threats that didn’t exist in the legacy 911 environment.”). 
 146 See 911.GOV, Current State of 911 Funding and Oversight, at 1 (2008), 
https://www.911.gov/pdf/National_911_Program_Current_State_911_Funding_Oversight_2
013.pdf (explaining “current 911 funding is unstable and inadequate to support the 
migration to NG911.”); Discussion Draft To Provide Funding for the Construction and 
Maintenance of a Nationwide, Interoperable Public Safety Broadband Network and for 
Other Purposes and on H.R. 4829, the Next Generation 911 Preservation Act of 2010 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Comm., Tech., and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and 
Com., 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher, H.R. Committee on Energy 
and Commerce) (maintaining “The largest single challenge to creating the first responder 
network is identifying and obtaining the funding that is needed for the buying, the 
installation, the operating, and the maintaining of the equipment that will provide broadband 
communications.”). 
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and local progress varied. 10 states reported that all 911 authorities in 
their state processed calls using NG911 systems. 18 states reported 
having no state or local NG911 transition plans in place, which indicates 
that these states were in early planning stages or had not yet begun.147 
Although the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) 
is leading efforts to ensure the implementation of NG9-1-1 is supported at a 
federal level, the fundamental issue of uneven implementation will persist.148 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has called upon NHSTA to 
“develop performance measures and goals to assess how the initiative meets its 
mission in supporting the implementation of the Next Generation 911 
system.”149 The greatest challenge facing federal agencies working to ensure 
effective rollout of NG9-1-1 are the various discrepancies between states and 
regions within states.150 For example, the National Association of State 9-1-1 
Administrators (NASNA) examined the authority that statewide 9-1-1 programs 
possessed in the implementation, and control over their networks.151 The study 
recognizes that state 9-1-1 programs are generally created by state legislatures, 
and that not all states even have 9-1-1 programs.152 The study also revealed that 
24 states did not possess the level of oversight or enforcement necessary to 
ensure funds secured via state tax or revenue streams for 9-1-1 are actually 
allocated to 9-1-1 services.153 In fact, the allocation of 9-1-1 funds to other state 
functions is a fraudulent act that has been plaguing state 9-1-1 agencies for over 
a decade.154 Although Congress is attempting to ensure proper federal oversight 
                                                          
 147 Kevin Randolph, GAO reviews Next Generation 911 implementation nationwide 
ahead of roadmap development, HOMELAND PREPAREDNESS NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/26999-gao-reviews-next-generation-911-
implementation-nationwide-ahead-roadmap-development. 
 148 Final Report of TFOPA Working Group 3, TASK FORCE ON OPTIMAL PUB. SAFETY 
ANSWERING POINT ARCHITECTURE (TFOPA), WASHINGTON UTILS. AND TRANSP. COMM’N, at 
5 (Sept. 28, 2018). 
 149 Edwards, supra note 4. 
 150 NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. 9-1-1 ADMINS, FOUR POTENTIAL SUSTAINABLE FUNDING MODELS 
FOR NG911, at 13 (2015). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 11. 
 153 Id. at 13; see Elaine Seeman et al, The First Step in Modernizing our 911 Emergency 
Call Centers: Revising the Sate Enhanced (E) 911 Legislative Funding Scheme to Efficiently 
Distribute 911 Funds, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y., 289, 298 (2012) (explaining North 
Carolina’s 9-1-1 funding formula was based off the “ill-fated assumption” that “local 
governments would spend their annual 911 fund distributions” but instead the states 
accumulated large surpluses for “unspecified purposes”). 
 154 Michael O’Rielly, States Must Stop Raiding 9-1-1 Fees, FED. COMM. COMMISSION 
(Mar. 1, 2017, 4:52 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2017/03/01/states-must-
stop-raiding-9-1-1-fees#_ftn1 (explaining that some states “divert fees collected for 
legitimate and needed 9-1-1 communications capabilities to unrelated purposes” and that the 
FCC has been dealing with the problem for almost fifteen years); see also COMM. ON 
2018]NG9-1-1, Cybersecurity & Contributions to the Model Framework 147 
for the implementation of NG9-1-1, the very localized nature of 9-1-1 is the 
greatest barrier to overcome in achieving a secure 9-1-1 network.155 Increased 
federal oversight is vital to ensure NG9-1-1 is not only implemented, but also 
secured. 9-1-1 networks did not effectively address the risk of cyber-attacks due 
to the “closed network function” of their systems. However, with integrated IP-
based networks, the level of oversight to ensure maximum operability and 
security of call networks need to increase.156 
B. Cybersecurity and the NG9-1-1 Act 
Continually, cybersecurity has received a significant amount of national 
attention. From Facebook’s violation of user trust, to President Trump’s 
Executive Order to strengthen the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical 
infrastructure, all evidences not only a national but international need to secure 
networks and data.157 The Act has placed an emphasis on cybersecurity, noting 
the risk of threats posed to PSAPs and next generation networks.158 It is critical 
                                                          
COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., THE ENHANCED 911 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 
2003, S. REP. NO. 108-130, at 3 (2003) (“Recently, State lawmakers and administrators have 
[…] discovered instances in which E–911 funds have been used for purposes other than the 
provision of E–911 service. Observers claim as many as 11 States have been ‘raiding’ their 
collected E–911 funds to satisfy other State obligations.”). 
 155 NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. 9-1-1 ADMINS, supra note 150, at 10 (discussing how Congress 
can use Federal grants to provide for funding and oversight in implementation of NG911); 
see S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 3 (stating that “a nationwide strategy for Next Generation 9-1-1 
services has become essential to help guide the transition and create a common framework 
for implementation of Next Generation 9-1-1 services,” and as such Congress is enacting 
legislation to achieve this goal). 
 156 See Jay English, Cybersecurity and the PSAP, APCO INST. (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.apcointl.org/doc/training-certification-1/481-cde-36485-cybersecurity-and-the-
psap/file.html (explaining that “new concerns are emerging about the safety of the 9-1-1 
closed-loop system, as we are discovering that the ‘loop’ may not be quite as ‘closed’ as 
we’ve always thought”). 
 157 WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER ON STRENGTHENING THE 
CYBERSECURITY OF FEDERAL NETWORKS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2017) (explaining 
that “the President will hold heads of executive departments and agencies (agency heads) 
accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises” and that “because risk 
management decisions made by agency heads can affect the risk to the executive branch as a 
whole, and to national security, it is also the policy of the United States to manage 
cybersecurity risk as an executive branch enterprise”); Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham 
Harrison, Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in 
major data breach, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-
us-election (“The data analytics firm that worked with Donald Trump’s election team and 
the winning Brexit campaign harvested millions of Facebook profiles of US voters, in one 
of the tech giant’s biggest ever data breaches, and used them to build a powerful software 
program to predict and influence choices at the ballot box.”). 
 158 S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 11 (“The Office, in consultation with the Department of 
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that the security of NG9-1-1 is not overlooked, and that the NG9-1-1 Act places 
the duty of addressing cybersecurity issues on the Department of Homeland 
Security, the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the FCC.159 
Although specific agencies have been delegated the responsibility in assisting 
with the implementation of specific standards, the Act designed “nonproprietary, 
consensus based standards” while still allotting for state, local, and regional 
control.160 Because the Act provides consensus-based standards, local 
governments are given the responsibility to ensure that their call networks and 
PSAPs are up-to-date and in accordance with those standards.161 As a result, any 
nonproprietary security protocols suggested by expert agencies will merely be 
left to each state and local government to independently implement either as 
local governments see fit, or as governments are capable.162 While it is in the 
interest of each state to consistently maintain a security centric approach 
regarding its PSAPs, an increase in federal support will play a role in ensuring 
consistent funding and support. Without consistent funding and continually 
managed security protocols at a local level, PSAPs may lapse in security updates 
and be left vulnerable to cyber threats. 
While a federal recommendation for cybersecurity will prevent the federal 
government from overreaching their regulatory authority, and respect the 
autonomy of state governments, it will not ensure effective and consistent 
cybersecurity efforts. There are major discrepancies in the status of PSAP 
technology throughout the United States.163 The 9-1-1 funding throughout the 
                                                          
Homeland Security and the National Institute for Science and Technology, shall provide 
support to States, localities, vendors, and other entities in addressing cybersecurity issues 
related to Next Generation 9-1-1 services.”). 
 159 See OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 6 (explaining that 
“the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) strongly recommends adopting the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework, which is a flexible, risk based approach to improving the security 
of critical infrastructure,” to address NG9-1-1 cybersecurity issues); Knight, supra note 90 
(discussing how “NG911 will also introduce new vectors for attack that can disrupt or 
disable PSAP operations, broadening the concerns of―and complicating the mitigation and 
management of―cyber risks across all levels of government,” and as such, the Department 
of Homeland Security Office of Emergency Communications and Department of 
Transportation National 911 Program has produced the NG911 Cybersecurity Primer to 
address said cybersecurity issues). 
 160 S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 4. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Raths, supra note 7 (“So far, […] the federal grant funding to help PSAPs transition 
to next-generation 911 has been minuscule.”); see Donny Jackson, Public-safety groups 
seek federal funds to pay for next-gen 911 (NG911) upgrades, URGENT COMM. (Mar. 21, 
2018), http://urgentcomm.com/ng-911/public-safety-groups-seek-federal-funds-pay-next-
gen-911-ng911-upgrades (discussing how “in 2012, Congress funded the implementation of 
an advanced, interoperable, wireless broadband network for first responders, known as 
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country has been subject to frequent misuse.164 These discrepancies, and PSAP’s 
uneven deployment of standards-based technology nationwide, are likely to 
persist in the absence of meaningful reform in the manner that PSAPs implement 
security protocols and network maintenance.165 PSAP jurisdictions receiving 
state and federal assistance and grants to effectively implement NG9-1-1 
security measures do not present major security risks, however, jurisdictions that 
lack funding and resources hindering implementation and regulation of proper 
security protocols are at greater risk of experiencing a cyber breach.166 
While the initial implementation of NG9-1-1 systems will significantly 
improve the security of updated PSAPs, the efforts to update these PSAPs will 
have little long-term effect without a consistent and diligent practice of cyber 
hygiene and security.167 Suggested standards provide a flexible way for PSAPs 
to independently and accurately gauge their own cyber preparedness. However, 
in the absence of meaningful federal support, suggested standards will only 
continue the uneven implementation of advanced security protocols.168 Future 
                                                          
FirstNet,” and that “the progress of FirstNet highlights the need for Congress to make a 
similar investment to modernize the complete emergency communications sector of our 
nation’s critical infrastructure by achieving Next Generation 911”). 
 164 See COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., AND TRANSP., supra note 154 (“State lawmakers and 
administrators have begun investigating the use of E-911 funds, and have discovered 
instances in which E–911 funds have been used for purposes other than the provision of E–
911 service.”); see O’Rielly, supra note 154 (“Some states divert fees collected for 
legitimate and needed 9-1-1 communications capabilities to unrelated purposes.”). 
 165 See GALLAGHER, supra note 50 (“NG911 technologies are expected to change the 
way 911 systems operate and interoperate. Local 911 systems may need to create or revise 
policies to accommodate the new technology. Similarly, with the ability to interconnect 
systems, there is potential to create a nationwide 911 system, which may create the need for 
new policies to ensure PSAPs are interoperable and secure.”); Elaine Seeman et al., Legal, 
Policy and Ethical Issues of Using Big Data and Predictive Analytics in Next Generation 
(NG) 911 to Notify and Aid the Dispatch of First Responders, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
547, 557 (2015) (“Notwithstanding the benefits of more NG911 data and information, the 
collection and delivery of these data and information by telecommunication carriers, 911 
service providers, PSAPs and first responder agencies [without proper security protocols in 
place] raise legal, ethical, and public policy issues to provide emergency services.”). 
 166 See GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 4 (“Each PSAP uses different technologies, is in 
different phases of upgrade, and is dependent on different sources of funding. […] As a 
result, there is variability in 911 levels of services [, such as security services,] across 
jurisdictions.”); James E. Holloway et al., Federalism in the Financing of 911 Emergency 
Call Services: Nature of the Federal-State Funding Arrangement to Finance Next 
Generation (NG) 911 Services, 5 J. L., TECH. & INTERNET 113, 126 (2014) (discussing how 
“NG911 funding arrangements must permit states to govern essential […] information 
management and technology interests and objectives needed to provide NG911 services,” 
including security). 
 167 GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 10. 
 168 Next Generation 9-1-1 Act of 2017, H.R. 4672, 115th Cong. §2 (2017); Realizing 
Nationwide Next-Generation 911 Before the Subcomm. on Commc’n and Tech. of the 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 3-4 (2017) (opening statement of Rep. 
Marsha Blackburn, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commc’n and Tech.); GALLAGHER, supra note 
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PSAPs must possess the resources to ensure that standards are consistently met 
and security is “baked in by design.”169 In the event PSAP security protocols 
lapse significantly, a malevolent cyber actor will undoubtedly possess the 
capability to inflict great harm upon the PSAP networks. As a recent 
congressional report pointed out: “[w]hile there is a national interest in 
promoting consistent cybersecurity policies across all PSAPs, there are no 
mechanisms in place to require state and local adoption of these best practices, 
which may present a risk to the NG911 network and the systems to which they 
interconnect.”170 
The increased resiliency of next generation systems is due to their 
interoperability, which happens to significantly increase the risk that an attack 
on one PSAP may have an effect on another interconnected PSAP.171 PSAP 
interoperability is a reference to a multitude of next generation capabilities, 
allowing  PSAPs to “seamlessly (1) receive calls and related data from 
origination networks, (2) share calls and related data among connecting ESInets, 
including across state boundaries, and (3) hand off calls and related data with 
each other.”172 Because NG9-1-1 interoperability is expected to be implemented 
first regionally, and then nationally, it is time “to adopt common technical 
standards that will enable interoperability,” as well as security.173 
V.  NG9-1-1 SYSTEMS IN THE AGGREGATE: A FUNDING CRISIS 
Because PSAPs operate on a state, regional, and local level, the challenge is 
unique in ensuring nationwide PSAP security. According to NENA, “as of 
December 2017, the United States [had] 5,783 primary and secondary 
PSAPs.”174 Many PSAPs will not make the transition from current 9-1-1 systems 
to NG9-1-1 without federal assistance.175 The NG9-1-1 Act proposes sustainable 
funding models.176 However, while current funding helps move PSAPs to next 
generation technology, it is not sufficient to protect PSAPs nationwide.177 
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 170 GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 10. 
 171 Id. at 8. 
 172 ASS’N OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMM. OFFICIALS-INT’L, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 
to Revise Regulations for the 911 Grant Program Under the Next Generation 911 
Advancement Act of 2012 (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D= 
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Diverting fees from underfunded 9-1-1 centers can “lead to understaffed calling 
centers, longer wait times in an emergency, and sluggish dispatch for public 
safety personnel. It also will slow the ability of 9-1-1 call centers to update their 
systems to support digital age technologies.”178 Although federal assistance 
programs, particularly the current multi-agency NG9-1-1 grant program, will 
provide essential funding to assist with the implementation of NG9-1-1, the 
implementation is only the first step in upgrading and enhancing nationwide 9-
1-1 networks.179 Once PSAP’s are operating on NG9-1-1 systems, their 
advanced capabilities and connectivity will create a perpetual cyber risk on a 
large scale if the necessary funding is not secured and then maintained.180 
The ultimate goal of the NG9-1-1 legislation is a nationwide deployment of 
9-1-1 and PSAPs.181 Through successful federal support, nearly 6,000 PSAPs in 
the United States would be upgraded to next generation networks.182 This means 
each of the 6,000 PSAPs integrated with IP-based networks will be left 
vulnerable to the same threats as any other IP-based network.183 However, each 
individual PSAP’s capabilities will likely vary due to discrepancies in 
funding.184 Although some PSAPs will implement secure networks, and conduct 
routine protocols to safeguard their ESI-networks, many PSAPs will likely 
receive inadequate funding and resources to maintain secure networks and will 
not have the capability to detect and prevent cyber threats.185 Even if a 
sustainable funding model can be created and executed, the local nature of 9-1-
1 guarantees that the actual implementation will vary.186 9-1-1 systems in the 
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90 (highlighting the range of risks potentially involved with NG911 and suggestions for 
possible mitigations of mentioned risks). 
 181 See S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 3. 
 182 9-1-1 Statistics, supra note 21; see also S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 2 (proposing 
accelerated implementation of NG-911 services to upgrade networks therefore increasing 
compatibility with emerging technologies). 
 183 Raths, supra note 88, at 2; see also GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 8-10 (listing the 
possible setbacks to nationwide deployment of NG911, and the funding issues states are 
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United States need certainty regarding the future security of their networks. 
In 2016, former FCC Chairman, Tom Wheeler recognized the need for 
Congressional action in NG9-1-1 implementation for PSAPs in a statement 
made before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology of the 
United States House of Representatives during a hearing on the “Oversight of 
the Federal Communications Commission.”187 During this hearing, he presented 
three points to help with the implementation and operation of NG9-1-1 and 
PSAPs.188 First, Chairman Wheeler called for a National 9-1-1 map to “eliminate 
the seams between commercial communications network infrastructure and 
emergency response dispatch systems.”189 Although this would provide clarity 
to the actual operational capability and mapping of PSAPs nationwide, this 
comment will focus on the latter two points. Second, Chairman Wheeler 
recognized the inability of PSAPs to keep up with cyber defense and called for 
bringing PSAPs under the protective wing of DHS’s “Einstein Program” to 
centralize security efforts.190 Third, Chairman Wheeler called for a national 
timetable, or target date, for completing the transition to NG9-1-1.191 By 
implementing Chairman Wheeler’s vision of federal support for PSAP’s and 
their implementation and operation of NG9-1-1, the emergency call network of 
the future can be a success. 
A.  Federal Funding of Public Safety Initiatives 
The NG9-1-1 grant program is a joint effort between the National 
Telecommunications Industry Administration (NTIA) and NHSTA.192 The 
program, authorized under the NG9-1-1 Advancement Act of 2012,193 allocated 
about “$115 million from spectrum auction proceeds” for NTIA and NHSTA to 
support the PSAP transition to NG9-1-1.194 States that participate in this program 
                                                          
 187 Hearings, supra note 9; see also Suresh Gursahaney, FCC Chairmen Calls for 
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are permitted to use funds from the program for the “adoption and operation of 
NG911 services and applications; and the implementation of IP-enabled 
emergency services and applications enabled by NG911 services, including the 
establishment of IP backbone networks and the application layer software 
infrastructure needed to interconnect the multitude of emergency response 
organizations.”195 The maximum amount of funds allotted through the program 
are “$500,000 per state and $250,000 per territory,” and although funds were 
expected to be awarded in early 2018, none have been awarded to date.196 
Although the 9-1-1 grant program addresses the issue of underfunded PSAPs, 
commenters on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the 9-1-1 grant 
program have expressed concern that the amount of funding available will only 
allow “marginal enhancements in any given area.”197 Other public safety 
associations have suggested alternative funding initiatives to efficiently use the 
available money.198 For example, APCO has gained support for their proposal 
to focus funding initiatives on specific facilities to create model PSAPs and spur 
statewide deployment.199 In their reply comment to the NPRM, APCO states: 
[T]he best way to use these grants is to create model deployments that 
demonstrate proofs of concept for fully-deployed and interoperable 
NG911 services in urban, suburban, and rural areas. By focusing on 
model NG911 deployments for a few areas, the grant program can better 
serve the entire country by producing blueprints for efficiently 
modernizing 911 systems nationwide. This should lower costs and 
speed implementations for systems that follow.200 
APCO continues to state that interoperability (“meaning PSAPs can 
seamlessly (1) receive calls and related data from origination networks, (2) share 
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calls and related data among connecting ESInets, including across state 
boundaries, and (3) hand off calls and related data with each other”) must remain 
a top priority and proposes to condition the grant of funding on “achieving and 
maintaining interoperability.”201 If the local government fails to obtain this 
objective, the conditional funding must be returned back to the grant fund.202 
While ideally, the NG9-1-1 grant program will be capable of sufficiently 
supporting PSAPs nationwide, without additional funding,203 APCO’s proposal 
is likely the most efficient way to leverage funding for the full implementation 
of NG9-1-1.204 
Although direct federal assistance for the implementation of NG9-1-1 in 
PSAPs would present an impracticable challenge, there may be alternative ways 
for the federal government to effectively aid in the implementation of NG9-1-1 
on a local level.205 Another public safety communications program may serve as 
a model or provide valuable lessons for the provision of federal assistance to 
local public safety networks.206 Specifically, the First Responder Emergency 
Network is an example of a federally sanctioned public safety initiative 
providing direct support to state and local governments.207 
While 9-1-1 inherently operates locally, the federal funding of local initiatives 
is not a foreign concept and FirstNet is the prime example of federal support for 
local public safety initiatives.208 FirstNet, authorized under the Middle Class Tax 
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that although there has been no direct mention that funds may be available for the NG9-1-1 
grant program, the FCC plans auctions in the 24 GHz and 28 GHz spectrum in the near 
future, auctions 101 and 102, which would provide a full fix for the lack of funding 
available for PSAPs). 
 204 Kirby, supra note 197; see also APCO International, Comment Letter on NTIA and 
NHTSA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the 911 Grant Program, No. 170420407-7407-
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FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/sites/default/files/factors-governor-decision.pdf (last 
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Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, is not yet in operation but will be “a 
wireless broadband network that will connect first responders.”209 FirstNet, 
operating under the authority of the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration of the Department of Commerce, is tasked with 
working with states individually to aid in the deployment of the public safety 
network and has the potential to serve as a model for increased cooperation 
between private and public sector organizations.210 AT&T has been awarded a 
25-year deal with FirstNet “to modernize and improve public safety 
communications by leveraging private sector resources, infrastructure, and cost-
saving synergies to deploy and operate the Network.”211 FirstNet’s “opt-in/opt-
out” approach is a system that can be revolutionary for the relationship between 
the federal government, and its ability to work with states and local public safety 
professionals.212 
Under the FirstNet initiative, States have the option to opt-in and allow 
FirstNet to deploy, operate, and maintain the state public safety Radio Access 
Network (RAN) created by AT&T.213 If a State chooses to opt-out, the state 
takes the responsibility to deploy, operate, and maintain the RAN.214 By 
choosing to opt-in, a state’s RAN will effectively operate under FirstNet 
authority, which in turn means funding for the network comes directly from 
FirstNet.215 The alternative option, opting-out, can still result in funding through 
National Telecommunications Industry Administration (NTIA) grant programs, 
                                                          
NAT’L TELECOMM & INFORMATION ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/public-safety 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
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with two territories and Washington, D.C.,” opted-in for FirstNet prior to the deadline); 
Jackson, supra note 163 (discussing how FirstNet works with each state to make an 
individualized plan). 
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 215 Consultation, FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/consultation/funding (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2018) (quoting “Members of the FirstNet outreach and design teams will work 
closely with the designated single officer or governmental body to develop and deliver a 
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although the option has been referred to as “more labor-intensive.”216 
Ultimately, all “50 states, two territories, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, 
American Samoa and the District of Columbia” chose to opt-in.217 The option of 
having a federally implemented communications network for state and local 
authorities has clearly gained significant traction in State and local governments, 
and the FirstNet template can serve as the proper framework that Congress is 
seeking for the NG9-1-1.218 
The most transferable concept from FirstNet to NG9-1-1 is the opt-in and opt-
out approach.219 APCO’s proposal to condition the grant of 9-1-1 funds to 
PSAPs, which relies on the PSAPs acceptance and maintenance of certain 
standards, is akin to an “opt-in” grant program.220 Similar to a State’s acceptance 
of FirstNet’s implementation and operation of their public safety network, when 
states opt-in, NTIA and NHSTA could grant NG9-1-1 funds on the condition 
that States follow certain standards and maintain certain operational 
capabilities.221 NTIA and NHSTA can serve as the monitoring agency; as with 
FirstNet, where their duty is to ensure funds are directly utilized to further 
federal standards set by the expert agencies.222 To encourage flexibility in the 
implementation of NG9-1-1 and planning prospectively, states should be able to 
either apply directly to NTIA and NHSTA, or have the option of submitting an 
application that outlines and details original implementation plans that are 
capable of meeting grant requirements, but may not necessarily be the provided 
implementation procedure.223 This format does not overextend the federal 
government, leaves states in control, and provides clear direction by offering 
immediate incentives to further conditional federal procedures. 
With the prospect of the NG9-1-1 grant program having increased 
engagement and providing more direction and incentive for states to implement 
next generation networks, an additional and pressing issue is ensuring the 
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security following implementation. 
B.  Centralized Cybersecurity 
In Chairman Tom Wheeler’s testimony before Congress, he proposed that 
NG9-1-1 cybersecurity be incorporated into DHS’s “Einstein Program.”224 The 
Einstein Program, managed by the National Cybersecurity Protection System 
within DHS and originally proposed in 2003, was an initiative “to be the primary 
cybersecurity system that would provide four major security capabilities to the 
Federal Government, such as intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, data 
analytics, and information sharing.”225 The program “was meant to be 
disseminated and integrated across all 23 Federal agencies’ IT networking 
systems to help safeguard any personally identifiable information (PII) and 
avoid malicious web hacking attempts.”226 However, while the Einstein Program 
was a promising idea, the actual implementation was insufficient.227 The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Einstein Program 
failed to meet the four objectives stated for itself, because twenty-three Federal 
agencies were inconsistently adopting the program.228 While the Einstein 
Program is currently not the all-encompassing and advanced cyber security 
system it was created to be, a significant amount of financial resources have been 
devoted to its improvement, with a forecasted total price tag of $5.7 billion.229 
As of April 2018, DHS was seeking up to $644 million “for a mix of programs 
to support federal agency cybersecurity, including the Continuous Diagnostics 
and Mitigation program and the network shield system known as Einstein.”230 It 
is clear that DHS is committed to not only improving the Einstein program, but 
also providing general cyber security for all of the federal government.231 
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However, DHS’s cyber efforts do not stop at the federal government.232 
DHS has recently been engaged in providing aid to the Election Assistance 
Commission in the management of a $380 million spending bill authorized “for 
state and local governments to improve their election system cybersecurity.”233 
Specifically, DHS has offered to provide “penetration testing, vulnerability 
assessments, exercises, training as well as threat information bolstered by help 
from the NSA and the intelligence community.”234 The significance of DHS 
collaborating to provide security to a state function is evidence that DHS is not 
only capable of providing cyber security to state authorities, but that this process 
should be a standard DHS procedure. PSAP cybersecurity functions should not 
only be supported by DHS, but are a natural extension of DHS cybersecurity. 
Congress should either include PSAPs in the future of the Einstein program as 
former Chairman Wheeler proposed or adopt a framework similar to Einstein 
which has a single entity, such as DHS, providing cybersecurity implementation, 
operation, and enhancement, to all PSAPs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
PSAPs are, and should be, considered critical infrastructure, and NG9-1-1 
will provide a much needed update to that infrastructure. They provide direction 
and control to our emergency responders during times of emergency, and with 
the updates of NG9-1-1, emergency responders and public safety officials will 
have significantly more information, direction, and overall increased efficiency. 
These improvements through IP-based networks, will save lives as well as 
increase the current security of 9-1-1 systems. However, these vast 
improvements and interconnectivity offer no solution to the security of 
emergency communications networks. IP-based networks inherently lack proper 
network security protocols. A long-term solution is vital to ensure continued 
financial support to such critical infrastructure otherwise these technological 
advancements will result in a fruitless endeavor. With the proper support for 
PSAPs, the lifeblood of 9-1-1, cyber vulnerabilities may be significantly 
mitigated. Given the current state of 9-1-1 and PSAPs being generally well 
under-funded, the federal government is best positioned to provide support for a 
nationwide transition to advance efforts. Because the nature of NG9-1-1 will 
facilitate increased interconnectedness across regions, and eventually the nation, 
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the federal government must treat future 9-1-1 networks as critical 
infrastructure. If the 9-1-1 grant program provides the support it promises,  
NG9-1-1 systems may be capable of hitting NENA’s target goal of having 
nationwide NG9-1-1 by 2020.235 However, cybersecurity cannot be overlooked 
and must take a central role of all future IP-based networks. While PSAP 
cybersecurity concerns are being considered, evident by new legislation and 
activity within administrative agencies, more must be done.236 By incorporating 
PSAPs as critical infrastructure under the protection of DHS, a centralized 
homeland-cybersecurity command can take a central role in mitigating risks and 
providing undeviating support to a secure nationwide emergency call network. 
What our country does now to support our 9-1-1 call centers may make the 
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